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Abstract 
 
The latest reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has recently been accepted, 
identifying important challenges for EU agriculture, but proposing only limited changes to the 
previous CAP. Now it is time for the implementation of the new measures. However, from a 
theoretical point of view, it seems that the CAP can hardly meet the challenges it faces due to the 
inconsistencies between the predefined challenges and the measures proposed to meet them. The 
aim of the paper is to systematically analyse the consistency between the challenges of European 
agriculture and the policy measures aimed at meeting them. It seems that not all measures are 
consistent with the challenges.  
 
Keywords: CAP, challenges, measures, consistency 
JEL code: Q18 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Commission (EC) has finalised legislative proposals that set out the overall 
direction of CAP reform for 2014-2020. The proposals, maintaining some of the fundamental 
inconsistencies of the current CAP, are presented in a complex economic and political situation. 
This situation is dominated at present by the Euro sovereign debt crisis, and includes issues such 
as growing world population, changing lifestyles and diet, price volatility, economic and food 
crises and global food security, climate change and environmental degradation. It is evident that 
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agriculture faces many challenges in the 21
st
 century, especially to increase the production of and 
access to sufficient and high quality food for a growing world population with changing diet 
while at the same time massively improving the management and use of scarce natural resources.  
 
To meet these challenges seems to require a radical change in the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP). However, the new reform package largely maintains the status quo and does not resolve 
the fundamental incoherence, illegitimacy and unsustainability of the CAP. The new measures 
ignore the facts that Europe is in its biggest crisis since the founding of the European Union and 
that there are several extremely urgent issues that need to be addressed now to avoid catastrophic 
problems in the upcoming years regarding food security, climate change and rural development. 
 
The paper provides a conceptual analysis of the challenges European agriculture faces and checks 
the consistency of these challenges with the latest reform measures. In other words, the aim of the 
paper is to check whether the new CAP helps European agriculture to meet the challenges it faces 
or not. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 shows the challenges and objectives of the 
CAP and analyses the consistencies between measures and challenges. Section 3 demonstrates 
some overall dilemmas for the CAP in the future, while Section 4 presents institutional factors 
determining the playing arena for the future CAP. Section 5 shows a possible road ahead.  
 
2. Challenges and objectives of the CAP 
 
The Communication of the European Commission published in 2010 identifies three key 
challenges for European agriculture (European Commission 2010):  
 
Food security. As the world’s population is expected to grow to around nine billion by 2050, 
global demand for food will significantly increase, resulting in a measurable growth in world 
food production. The EU should be able to contribute to world food demand by preserving and 
improving its agricultural production capacity while meeting the high safety, quality and welfare 
standards required by its citizens as well. In order to meet this challenge, the CAP has to stabilise 
incomes and markets as well as improve the international competitiveness of its agricultural 
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sector and the functioning of the food supply chain in times of greater market uncertainty, 
increased price volatility and stagnating agricultural incomes. 
 
Environment and climate change. Agriculture and the environment are inextricably linked. 
Farming practices can have beneficial (e.g. organic agriculture) or harmful (e.g. intensive 
agriculture) effects on the environment, while the provision of public goods can potentially offer 
several environmental benefits (e.g. biodiversity, climate stability, resilience to natural disasters, 
etc.). At the same time, climate change can have various effects on agriculture in the long run 
(e.g. flooding, drought, etc.) Therefore, the future CAP should help agriculture mitigate climate 
change through reduced greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and various measures to increase 
production efficiency (e.g. energy efficiency, carbon sequestration, etc.). 
 
Territorial balance. Agriculture is still an important sector in the rural economy, offering job 
possibilities and income to rural residents and generating many additional economic activities 
(e.g. food processing, tourism and trade). However, many territorial imbalances, mainly between 
Old and New Member States, exist in the EU. The CAP should tackle these imbalances by 
improving the vitality and economic potential of all the rural areas inside the EU. 
 
Three main objectives are derived from these challenges, according to the Communication 
(European Commission 2010):  
 
Viable food production. In order to reach this objective, the future CAP should (1) contribute to 
farm incomes and limit their variability, (2) improve the competitiveness of the agricultural 
sector and enhance its value share in the food chain and (3) compensate for production 
difficulties in areas with specific natural constraints. 
 
Sustainable management of natural resources and climate action. This objective also contains 
three elements: (1) enhancing sustainable production practices and securing the provision of 
environmental public goods, (2) encouraging green growth through innovation and (3) pursuing 
climate change mitigation and adaptation actions.  
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Balanced territorial development. The third objective is also made up of three policy sub-
objectives: (1) supporting rural employment, (2) improving the rural economy and promoting 
diversification and (3) encouraging structural diversity in farming systems by improving 
conditions for small farms and developing local markets. 
 
By thinking in terms of sustainability, the above-mentioned challenges can easily be transformed 
into economic, environmental and social challenges. In order to meet these challenges, various 
measures are proposed in the latest CAP reform. It is worth while to analyse whether these 
proposals are consistent with the challenges – if not, it is doubtful how the former contribute to 
the latter.  
 
2.1. Consistency of economic challenges and measures 
 
The most important economic challenge for the CAP in the future is to secure food supplies. This 
challenge is to be met via various measures among which probably the most important is the 
continued provision of direct payments. Established in 1992 and significantly changed in 2003, 
direct payments are now decoupled from production and pertains to the ‘green box’ (non-
distorting subsidy) of the WTO. Europe spent 70% of the CAP budget to direct payments in 2012 
(European Commission 2013a), aiming to stabilize incomes of farmers. This amount was spent 
on European farmers representing 5.4 percent of the EU’s population and generating 1.6 percent 
of the Union’s GDP (European Commission 2013a). 
 
Despite their obvious importance to European farmer accounts, the vast majority of the 
professional literature analysing the CAP considers that direct payments are well past their sell-
by date. Swinnen (2009), for instance, argues that Single Farm Payments (SFP) are not effective 
in any defensible dimension: (1) Agricultural employment is still decreasing despite large and 
increasing direct support; (2) the majority of farm household incomes come from off-farm 
sources, reflecting improved integration of rural areas and markets with the general economy; (3) 
the distribution of support is very uneven amongst farm sizes (and types and regions), with those 
perhaps most deserving or needing support receiving the least; (4) most support is dissipated to 
input suppliers and landowners, since payments are based on historical rights and linked to land 
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use; (5) cross compliance is either largely ineffective or impossibly expensive as a means of 
paying for agriculturally-related public goods (conservation, amenity, recreation and 
environmental (care) goods and services).  
 
Swinnen (2009) well summarises the arguments that improvements in farm incomes due to 
support are temporary, which both history and economic logic demonstrate. Competition in the 
industry soon results in the revenue increase being capitalised in the value of farm assets, or 
being spent on increased costs of production. In either case, market competition ensures that total 
production costs will increase to match the supported increase in revenue. In effect, the benefits 
of support are frozen into higher costs for the sector and its businesses. Entrants to the supported 
industry have to purchase or rent their farm assets and pay the additional costs generated by the 
support, and are, consequently, no better off with the policy than they would have been without 
it. Incomes in the industry continue to be determined largely by the earnings available elsewhere 
and outside the industry. But, by the same token, removing existing support is especially 
damaging to new entrants, since many of their expenditures are based on and cannot be justified 
without the support. Farmers, and thus their industry and political representatives, have become 
dependent on, if not addicted to continued support.  
 
Moreover, direct payments suffer from very substantial legitimacy problems. They are still 
calculated on the basis of historical production references and they establish the various levels of 
support that existed in the past by sector and territory. Furthermore, they do not reflect the 
changes recorded in the orientations of farms after decoupling as they do not appreciate the 
flexibility of a farmer in making production decisions. They neither reflect recent changes in 
market prices, consequently overcompensating producers of cereals and oilseed (direct 
beneficiaries of the price increases of agricultural commodities), while abandoning livestock 
producers (who are suffering from an increase in the cost of feedstuffs). Compensation for past 
price cuts is no longer necessary. Generalised per hectare payments are not targeted, whatever 
name is given or conditions attached to them (Tangermann 2011).  
 
Meanwhile, there is no evidence that farm households in industrialised OECD countries have 
systematically lower incomes than other households, so policies to support incomes across the 
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whole sector are unjustified (Swinnen 2009). Agricultural income per work unit is not an 
appropriate indicator of standard of living as it depends on total household income of the family 
concerned. This means that farm income support has to be based on overall incomes of farm 
households where income from other sources often complements agricultural income. Direct 
payments have limited potential for supporting farm income, which is the official motivation of 
the support. If support was eliminated, land values would fall, structural change speed up and 
incomes from other sources grow, leaving the total income of farm households (remaining in the 
sector) more or less unaffected (Sahrbacher et al. 2007). Besides all these, it is pretty hard to 
understand why the CAP subsidises farmers’ incomes in times of increasing food prices. As 
evident from Figure 1, producer prices have increased for almost all countries and products 
concerned in the European Union from 2004-2006 to 2011. Cereals prices have experienced the 
biggest increase, followed by meat and milk prices. As price increases have reached 100% in 
many cases, direct payments contributing further to farmers’ incomes seem obsolete. 
 
Figure 1. Producer price indices for selected products in the EU27 in 2011 (2004-2006=100, %) 
 
Source: composed by the authors based on FAO (2014) 
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Direct payments are neither equitably distributed by farm size, nor by geographical location (EC, 
2013a). The 80/20 rule applies – approximately 80 per cent of the support goes to 20 per cent of 
farmers (recipients). Small farmers, especially, are handicapped in many ways. Though they are 
eligible for direct payments, due to the small farm size and administrative procedures, most 
receive marginal amounts or do not even participate in the system. As Zahrnt (2009) and others 
have also emphasised, payment rates per hectare are also widely dissimilar, ranging from €500+ 
in Greece to €174 in Portugal. Furthermore, following the EU Copenhagen agreement, direct 
payments were introduced at lower initial rates in the new Member States (NMS), which have 
still not reached the level of the EU15 in Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia. However, the EU10 
reached the 100 per cent payment level in 2013. Indeed, the NMS complemented for the 
transitional period of 10 years EU-funded direct payments with national supplements to make 
good the difference between their own payment rates and those of the old (and largely richer) 
Member States.  
 
The common status of these payments has been violated and national co-funding has been 
established. A little-remarked consequence is that the budgetary cost to the EU of the SFP rose 
significantly from the level of EU accession (25 per cent) to 2013 as the EU-funded component 
of the SFP rose to 100 per cent in the EU10, while pressures to reduce the budgetary cost of the 
policy also rose.  
 
Moreover, there is a critical paradox at the heart of the claim that SFPs are WTO green: if, 
indeed, SFPs do not distort farm production decisions, what exactly, do they do? If these 
payments help farmers at all, they must result in farms staying in business when they otherwise 
would not, and therefore cannot help but affect the structure of production. Whether or not this 
structural effect also and necessarily affects the total European volume of production, and if so, in 
what direction, remains an empirical question. It may be possible to defend claims for green box 
status for the SFP system, though this is not guaranteed. In any event, world trading partners can 
be expected to continue to seek ways of challenging the green status of SFPs so long as the 
inherent paradox remains. 
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Based on these critiques, the 2013 CAP reform changed the former system of direct payments 
and introduced various novelties (e.g. greening, small farmers scheme, internal and external 
convergence, active farmers, etc.). However, it seems that even the modified system of direct 
payments is not consistent with the challenge of increased food security.  
 
First, as the current system of decoupled direct support suggests, a farmer need not even produce 
to receive a fixed income. If a farmer does not produce agricultural commodities, it is hard to 
imagine how he or she contributes towards ensuring global food security. Consequently, 
stabilising farmers’ incomes does not necessarily mean guaranteeing food security, despite the 
fact that food security still remains the Commission’s major reason for maintaining farm income 
support. By seeking to stabilise all farmers’ incomes, current direct payments seem to focus on 
social and environmental issues instead of focusing on enhancing the competitiveness of farms. 
Second, greening is also against food security – by introducing super-cross-compliance type 
measures (Matthews 2011), competitiveness and profitability of farmers are decreasing. In 
addititon, greening is a high-cost policy compared to payments directly targeting public goods. 
Moreover, many farmers treat ecological focus areas as a resurrection of set-aside abolished in 
2008, while diversification of crops is fully against economies of scale (Matthews 2011). Third, 
the maintenance of coupled subsidies might help reaching food security in specific regions, 
though the magnitude of its impact is doubtful. Fourth, specific programmes for small scale 
farmers, on the one hand, decrease administrative costs of small farms, though on the other hand, 
it does not encourage creating efficient scales and support keeping the land price high. Fifth, 
redistribution of direct payments helps decreasing inequalities, though its extent is dubious.  
 
On the whole, it is evident that problems raised above are treated by the new system of direct 
payments but not solved. It is an interesting question whether direct payments will exist even 
after 2020.  
 
Besides direct payments, according to the European Commission (2010), food security should be 
reached via the stabilization of agricultural markets. It is a serious concern for the future whether 
the CAP can really stabilize agricultural markets. The economic and food crisis of 2008 and 2011 
highlighted that the issue of food security, which seemed to have been already solved since the 
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1970s, is now back to the policy agenda. Extreme price volatility, experienced in global markets 
since 2008, has serious consequences for the stabilisation of agricultural markets. Furthermore, it 
seems that food prices will remain at a generally higher level in the future.  
 
In addition to the stabilization of farm incomes, the European Commission seeks to increase 
competitiveness of European agriculture, thereby meeting the challenge of global food security. 
However, the way of doing so also has some caveats. First of all, competitiveness enhancement 
of agriculture pertains to the second pillar of the CAP, though some elements (market 
stabilization, direct payments, etc.) will remain in the first pillar. It is a question, therefore, what 
coherence would exist between the two pillars to target this issue.    
 
Enhancing competitiveness has implications for trade policy. EU agriculture as a whole is 
required to compete in the world market, and trade policy basically determines the way it does so. 
In order to enhance the competitiveness of its farmers, the EU has many trade policy tools, from 
increasing import tariffs to banning imports of specific agricultural products coming from outside 
the Community, but these options are not respected by the WTO. Competitiveness can also be 
strengthened by further increasing subsidies to farmers, thereby reducing their already high costs 
of production, though this again may not be the best solution in the long run because subsidies 
artificially shield farmers from healthy competition hindering the evolution of more modern, 
more efficient agriculture. Direct payments may allow farmers to withstand international 
competition. However, such “artificial” competitiveness keeps agriculture dependent on 
government payments. 
 
Increasing European food safety standards are also against the competitiveness of EU 
agriculture. Cross-compliance, greening requirements as well as plant and animal welfare 
measures imply additional costs for European farmers compared to their third country 
counterparts. Therefore, it is dubious how the CAP, based on high standards, will increase 
competitiveness in the long run as Europe faces increasing competition in the globalised 
agricultural and food system. However, food is more than just a commodity. European consumers 
demand healthy and safe food and thus the major challenge for European farmers is to make their 
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products visible and recognisable to all European consumers for its quality, safety and diversity 
and thereby making them different to products coming from outside the EU.  
 
Moreover, issues related to genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are also on the table when 
talking about agricultural competitiveness in Europe. Do GMOs have a European future, or will 
they continue to be marginalized by many European consumers and governments? And if so, will 
this be accepted by the EU’s major trading partners, or will it lead to trade conflicts and new 
disputes in the World Trade Organization (WTO)? As the share of genetically modified products 
is increasing in world trade, agricultural competitiveness is largely determined by the decision on 
their use.  
 
On the whole, one must take into account that there is no study describing and testing scenarios 
under which EU food supplies would be insufficient (Zahrnt 2011). However, without evidence, 
it is unclear how a major policy instrument of the CAP can be justified.  
 
2.2. Consistency of environmental challenges and measures 
 
The CAP is faced with numerous environmental challenges, including, inter alia, GHG emissions 
and climate change, soil depletion, water/air quality, habitats and biodiversity. These challenges 
are best tackled by focusing on the sustainable management of natural resources and climate 
action with three-sub-objectives: sustainable production practices and the provision of 
environmental public goods, green growth through innovation and climate change mitigation and 
adaptation actions (European Commission 2010). The long run sustainability of agriculture in the 
EU depends on maintaining the underlying natural resource (soil, water, air and biodiversity) 
base. Although farmers are the managers of the majority of land and water resources across the 
EU, agriculture provides a modest or even declining share of economic activity in most rural 
areas (Cunha – Swinbank 2011). In practice, the latest CAP reform elaborates greening 
measures, while green growth and climate change mitigation and adaptation actions seem to 
remain high-flown rhetoric.  
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In the current system, cross-compliance represents the compulsary basic layer of environmental 
requirements and obligations to be met in order to receive full CAP funding. On top of this, from 
2015 onwards, the CAP introduces green direct payment rewarding farmers for respecting three 
obligatory agricultural practices, namely maintenance of permanent grassland, ecological focus 
areas and crop diversification. At least 30% of the budget of each rural development programme 
must be reserved for voluntary measures that are beneficial for the environment and climate 
change (agri-environmental- climate measures, organic farming, areas for natural constraints, 
Natura 2000 areas, forestry measueres, and investments which are beneficial for the environmnet 
or climate). However, greening measures still have many deficiencies.  
 
First, linking direct payments to the provision of public goods is an illogical conception. Since 
1992, direct payments have been given for many reasons but it is clear that the system is still 
based on the reference yields of 1986-1990 (2000-2002 for the new members). Thereby the new 
conception implicitly assumes that those receiving a high amount of direct payments (e.g. those 
who had high yields in the reference period) provide numerous public goods, which is surely not 
the case. In marginal regions where costs of production are high, direct payments can contribute 
to more biodiversity and landscape preservation (Brady et al. 2009), though these payments are 
the highest in fertile regions due to their origin as compensation for price cuts. As evident from 
Figure 2, there is no clear relationship between direct payments and NATURA 2000 areas (as a 
proxy for measuring agri-environmental status). We can not state that those regions with higher 
environmental values get more direct payments. Actually, correlation between the two indicators 
is negative at the EU27 level (R = -0.29) (European Commission 2013a). 
 
Figure 2. Relatonship between direct payments and NATURA 2000 areas in EU27 in 2012 
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Note: Direct payments are calculated per hectare (based on UAA data).  
Source: composed by the authors based on European Commission (2013a) 
 
Second, the Communication seems to neglect the fact that one of the biggest problems with the 
provision of environmental public goods in agriculture lies in the insufficiency of measurement 
methods. If we are to achieve global objectives for halting/slowing down biodiversity loss, it is 
important that we demonstrate the economic value of ecosystem goods and services. However, 
we cannot measure – aside from making educated guesses – the value of a landscape or the value 
of biodiversity, and it is unclear what kind of methods the Commission proposes for solving this 
problem. Over the past decade, progress has been made in understanding how ecosystems 
provide services and how service provision translates into economic value. Yet, it has proven 
difficult to move from general pronouncements about the tremendous benefits nature provides to 
people to credible, quantitative estimates of ecosystem service values. Spatially explicit values of 
services across landscapes that might inform land-use and management decisions are still 
lacking (Balmford et al. 2002; Reid et al. 2005).  
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It is also questionable as to whether we have a common value for public goods for Europe and it 
is very doubtful that the same public goods policy should apply to Old and New Member States, 
still less for each and every region or farm. Moreover, without knowing the proper indicators and 
measurement methodology, the efficiency of the delivery of environmental public goods can 
hardly be evident. Questions arise as to who will evaluate (and on what basis) whether public 
money spent on the provision of public goods has lead to the achievement of the policy’s aims or 
not. Going further, if we can not measure the outcome, or Member States are not willing to pay 
for it from the national budget, it is doubtful that taxpayers will understand exactly what they are 
paying for. 
 
Third, the CAP seems to do little to meet the EU’s overall objective in its Biodiversity Strategy 
for 2020 - to halt the loss of diversity and to restore degraded ecosystems. Ecological Focus 
Areas (EFAs) are limited to less than 50% of the EU arable area and permanent crops, grasslands 
or pastures do not need EFA. EFAs can also include land uses with doubtful benefits for 
biodiversity. In the absence of specific management guidelines, EFAs will likely contribute little 
to biodiversity. Cultivating three crops on large, intensively managed farms is unlikely to 
enhance biodiversity and these targets are currently lower than existing average crop diversity in 
many member states. In addition, the new regulation did not do more to improve the cost-
effectiveness of Pillar 2 schemes in terms of uptake and biodiversity outcomes (Pe'er et al. 2014).  
 
Fourth, the provision of public goods seems to require significant institutional and administrative 
background for the management of these programmes. It is doubtful that these programmes can 
be well-administered without a measurable increase in bureaucracy both at the EU and national 
level. However, such an increase would result in cost increases and work against the “cutting the 
red tape” principle, as indicated by the Commission (European Commission 2010).  
 
Fifth, the coherence between greening and the current agri-environmental programmes remains 
questionable. The question is what the greening component could potentially deliver that cannot 
yet be delivered by the existing instruments. It is not clear why the respective set of agri-
environmental actions should be moved from the second pillar to the first pillar with its much 
different implications for decision making and financing. As the payments under the greening 
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component will be financed out of the EU budget, without any national co-financing, member 
states will feel to make sure the money from Brussels provides the highest conceivable benefits. 
So the choice of actions chosen from the menu for implementation of the greening component in 
the individual member states is not primarily based on the most needed and effective agri-
environmental policy but on what promises the largest benefits to domestic farmers 
(Tangermann, 2011).  
 
Sixth, it is not clear whether subsidies from the first pillar are more efficient than those from the 
second. As the principle of equivalence, developed by the latest CAP reform, suggests, farmers 
participating in specific agri-environmental programmes (organic production, Natura 2000 etc.) 
automatically meet greening requirements, implying that second pillar instruments are better 
serving the environment than first pillar ones. However, the first time in the history of the CAP, 
the share of first pillar funds are increasing at the expense of the second. Based on these 
problems, another logical question arises as to what effect the “greening component” would have 
on the expenditure balance between the two pillars.  
 
Innovation, green growth and climate change mitigation are also important objectives of the 
CAP, though the 2013 CAP reform have not elaborated measures in this regard. We are not 
aware of the exact places and the magnitude of impacts of climate change, for instance, nor is it 
clear how the CAP would tackle the obvious challenges in this regard. Although the fifth priority 
of the second pillar is related to climate change, objectives are overly general without details.  
 
2.3. Consistency of social challenges and measures 
 
The objective of balanced territorial development is planned to be tackled by supporting rural 
employment, improving the rural economy and promoting diversification and encouraging 
structural diversity in farming systems by improving conditions for small farms and developing 
local markets. Measures elaborated for reaching these aims are the Common Strategic 
Framework, the new rural development priorities, the simplification of rural development 
subsidies, the introduction of minimum spending requirements (agri-environment 30%, Leader 
(or CLLD) 5%) and the introduction of European Innovation Partnerships. 
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Although these measures bring new concepts to the European rural development policy, several 
concerns emerge regarding their effectiveness. First and foremost, it is still not clear what rural 
development is about in the CAP. On the basis of the former four axes, the current six priorities 
and their associated funding, rural development is mainly about agricultural competitiveness 
enhancement and agri-enviornmental support, while classical rural development seems to be side-
tracked. Increasing quality of life, creating jobs, alleviating rural poverty, decreasing the urban-
rural income gap or developing rural infrasturcutre remain just objectives in slogan without any 
clear measures for reaching them. This argument is also strengthened by the fact that around 20% 
of the CAP budget is spent on rural development, while 20% of the rural development budget is 
spent on classical rural development – all this ends up in 4% of the CAP is spent on core rural 
development issues. As Figure 3 suggests, that vast majority of rural development funds were 
spent on the first two axes in the EU in 2007-2013, while classical rural development played just 
a marginal role in most member states. 
 
Figure 3. Relative importance of the 3 thematic axes by Member State (2007-2013) 
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Source: composed by the authors, based on European Commission (2013a: 303). 
 
The exact place of rural development within the EU policy framework is also unclear. On the one 
hand, the CAP has recently expanded its traditional agricultural focus to a broader array of rural 
actors via Axis 3 and 4 (territorial approach , though many measures of the other axes (sectoral 
approach) also have a number of second order effects (enhancing local agricultural employment, 
tourism, etc.), retaining people in rural areas. This process strengthens the retention of rural 
development policy inside the CAP together with the fear that cohesion policy would be more 
likely to focus on urban centres rather than rural areas. On the other hand, there are also strong 
grounds for arguing that rural development should be reallocated into the Cohesion Fund. One of 
the strongest arguments, put forth by DG Regio, is that such a shift would bring increased 
coherence in rural development at the EU level. 
 
Coordination of the various EU Funds seems to have caused difficulties for many Member States 
concerning their management, thereby causing the lack of synergies and a number of overlaps 
between them. Given the birth of the Common Strategic Framwork, it seems that rural 
development will still be funded by the CAP, though the effectiveness of rural development 
programs is a key question for the future.  
 
Table 1 summarises the arguments made in this section.  
 
Table 1. Challenges, objectives and measures of the CAP 2014-2020 
Challenges Objectives Measures 
Food security 
1. Farm income support and 
limitation of variability 
2. Competitiveness and value 
share enhancement of agricultural 
sector 
3. Compensation in areas with 
specific natural constraints 
1. Direct payments 
2. Stabilisation of agricultural markets 
3. Competitiveness enhancement 
Environment and climate 
change 
1. Sustainable production 
practices and the provision of 
environmental public goods 
2. Green growth through 
innovation 
3. Climate change mitigation and 
adaptation actions 
1. Enhance the provision of public goods via 
the greening component of direct payments 
2. Promote green growth through innovation 
3. Pursue climate change mitigation actions 
Territorial balance 1. Support for rural employment 1. Support rural employment 
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2. Enhance and diversify the rural 
economy 
3.  Improve conditions for small 
farms and develop local markets 
2. Improve the rural economy and promote 
diversification 
3. Allow for structural diversity in farming 
systems 
Source: composed by the authors 
 
3. Overall dilemmas 
 
Regarding the future of the CAP, several general dilemmas emerge, having impacts on economic, 
environmental and social measures. First of all, it is questionable to what extent national 
agricultural policies will increase their role inside the CAP. Several signs of the latest reform 
indicate that member states get more freedom in the implementation of the CAP (distribution of 
the different components of direct payments, defining national rural development priorities, etc.) 
This is an important issue as different national implementations might alter the overall 
consistency between challenges and measures. 
 
The second dilemma is raised in connection with the structure of the two pillars. Although the 
first pillar has traditionally dealt with agricultural markets (and direct payments later on) and the 
second with rural development, many measures are questioning this divison of tasks (e.g. 
greening in the first pillar, payments for young farmers and LFA from both pillars, 
competitiveness enhancement from the second pillar, etc.). A consistent CAP would require a 
clear division of work. Maintaining two pillars, one requiring co-financing and the other not, will 
also maintain the bias against rural development payments, which need to be matched with 
domestic funds. The convergence of payments across member states is generally more the 
product of considerations of what might be politically acceptable than of an economic logic. 
 
Last but not least, it is still questionable whether the ‘one size fits all’ approach is working for 
the CAP. Can we apply the same policy for different regions? The current CAP has been planned 
for meeting the needs of the founders and old member states, though needs of the new members 
are hardly touched upon (Gorton et al. 2009). This issue might also alter the CAP’s capacity to 
meet the challenges European agriculture faces, especially considering possible new accession 
rounds. 
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4. The role of institutional factors 
 
Various institutional factors will also determine whether European agriculture will meet the 
challenges it faces. In designing the CAP, factors outside agriculture should also be taken into 
account. 
 
The first institutional factor is EU’s overall development strategies (currently the Europe 2020), 
determining the playing arena for the CAP. European agriculture can contribute to the five 
priorities defined by Europe 2020 in many ways. On the one hand, the promotion of renewable 
energies and the support for agri-environmental programmes will help decreasing the emission of 
greenhouse gases. On the other hand, supporting the local economy and job creation might help 
increasing rural employment and alleviating rural poverty. Furthermore, the promotion of 
research and development in agriculture also help innovation. 
 
The second important institutional factor is the budget of the European Union. The substantial 
pressures on the EU budget indicate that traditional agricultural support is not likely to be 
preserved at anything like its present level in the future. At present, Pillar 1 of the CAP continues 
to be wholly financed by the EU budget, in contrast to all other European policies. This ‘financial 
solidarity’ provision is a relic of the old market intervention CAP, and is not strictly necessary for 
a CAP dominated by decoupled single payments. Any decisions on the budget will have an 
impact on how effectively European agriculture can meet the challenges it faces. 
 
The third institutional factor is the WTO and the international trade talks which have always 
been and will continue to be a major external pressure on the shape and form of the CAP. Present 
calls from some quarters for a return to market intervention are inconsistent with present WTO 
rules, to say nothing of the revised rules likely to be agreed sometime under Doha. The CAP is 
presently ‘WTO-compliant’ – in that the SFPs, particularly, can be included in the ‘green’ (non-
distorting) box, exempting them from either control or dispute through the WTO. So long as this 
is the case, further negotiated reductions in import tariffs, and elimination of export subsidies 
may well generate strong pressure within the EU for extension, even increases, in SFPs in 
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compensation for the reduced market support, as has happened to date. As the EU28 became the 
world’s number one exporter of agricultural and food products in 2013, the role of WTO trade 
negotiations even increases (European Commission 2014). However, EU farm producer prices 
are now very close to world market prices, suggesting that high tariffs are largely redundant in 
providing protection to EU producers. Yet, they still prevent third countries from competing on 
the EU market (WTO 2013). 
 
Last but not least, global agreements of the EU with third countries also play a role in the 
effectiveness of the agricultural policy in Europe. The slow progress of the Doha Development 
Agenda contributed to the intensification of regional trade agreements (e.g. with Asia and Korea). 
As the US is currently about to offer preferential market access to its South-East Asian trade 
partners, the EU is under pressure to lose existing trade partners from the region (European 
Commission 2013b). Moreover, the currently running trade talks between EU and US on free 
trade can bring significant economic gains as a whole for the EU (Francois et al. 2013). On the 
whole, if the EU signs new agreements with third countries, these might have agricultural 
consequences (like the free trade agreement signed with Canada). This factor also contains 
possible further enlargements of the EU, implying new measures for the current system 
consisting of 28 member states. 
 
5. The road ahead 
 
Based on the arguments above, it seems that European agriculture will hardly meet the 
challenges it faces as there exists just a partial consistence between agricultural challenges and 
measures. It is very doubtful how the could CAP meet the challenges it faces. We believe that 
fundamental challenges are needed in the future, addressing the key challenges as follows: 
 
1. Build the CAP on three pillars. As evident from above, two pillars for three challenges are 
not enough. Instead, all challenges should be associated with their own pillar, thus 
creating a food, an environmental sustainability and a territorial balance pillar. Such a 
system would be more transparent and better focused as well as it would create a better 
division of tasks among pillars.  
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2. Phase out the system of direct payments. It is evident that direct payments are well past 
their sell-by-date. They are not effective in making European agriculture more food 
secure nor are they capable of making efficient contributions to the provision of public 
goods. Better targeted policy instruments are needed to make European agriculture food 
secure and competitive. Innovation based on research and development, education and 
training, advisory services and appropriate institutions serving agriculture are the major 
means of raising productivity, thus enhancing competitiveness. From the food security 
side, there is no need to make direct payments in order to stimulate extra production in 
Europe. In response to the challenge of global food security, more food production in 
Europe cannot make a contribution to that goal as it would make it more difficult for 
developing country agriculture to create income and employment opportunities 
(Tangermann 2011). Europe has to concentrate on competitiveness and productivity. 
3. Invest in climate smart agriculture. Greening, as we suggest, is not an efficient policy 
instrument in meeting the environmental challenges European agriculture faces. The 
future CAP should focus on adapting European agriculture to climate change by heavily 
investing in research and technology. Conducting research and developing tools for 
quantifying environmental impacts of farming practices is of great importance as well. A 
proper monitoring and evalutation system should be created for measuring environmental 
impacts on the farm level and giving feedbacks to policy makers on the efficiency of 
environmental instruments. 
4. Create a real rural development policy. The future CAP should clean rural development 
policy by focusing solely on classical issues of rural development like poverty reduction, 
job creation and investment in rural infrastructures with the overall aim of increasing rural 
quality of life. It is a reasonable objective for a common policy for agriculture to 
contribute to reduction of poverty and cohesion. All other activities (competitiveness, 
agri-environmental issues) should be placed in the other pillars  
 
6. Conclusions 
 
The paper has analysed the challenges European agriculture faces and has checked for the 
consistency of these challenges with the latest reform measures. We found that economic, 
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environmental and social challenges, identified by the Commission, do not seem to align with the 
measures proposed to meet them. Direct payments along with the EU’s agricultural 
competitiveness and food quality policies do not help in reaching the food security goal, while 
greening measures can hardly contribute to the environmental challenges European agriculture 
faces. Moreover, the EU’s rural development policy is ineffective in meeting the well known 
European social challenges. A new three pillar CAP, with phased-out direct payments, focusing 
on climate smart agriculture and genuine rural development policy, along the lines we suggest, is 
the key for the future.  
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